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Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (WTO) | ![]() |
1) URUGUAY ROUND
2) WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
3) ORGANIZATION&STRUCTURE OF WTO
4) DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
5) SETTLING DISPUTES
6) 10 BENEFITS OF WTO
7) 10 MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT WTO
8) KARSIT GORUSLER
9) TURKEY&WTO RELATIONS
10) PREFERNCES
1) THE URUGUAY ROUND
For
all small and medium sized trading nations, conducting trade according to
multilaterally agreed concepts, principles and rules rather than resort to
bilateral negotiating power is of paramount importance. For developing
countries, one of the most important outcomes of the Uruguay Round is the
substantial strengthening of the rules based multilateral trading system and its
extension to new areas of activity. Existing disciplines have been tightened in
a number of areas including those involving the use of subsidies, countervailing
and anti-dumping duties and safeguard measures.
This
will have important implications for developing countries. For example,
"grey area measures" such as voluntary export restraints will be
eliminated and there will be tighter disciplines on the use of anti-dumping
measures. Developing countries have frequently found themselves on the receiving
end of such measures. Besides, the extension of the rules of the multilateral
trading system to new areas will serve to further increase the importance of the
rules-based system for developing countries. However, tightened disciplines
covering a wider area of international commerce are only effective if there
exists an efficient and equitable means to settle disputes in the event of a
breach of obligations. The Uruguay Round will bring considerable improvements in
the dispute settlement mechanism.
The
General Agreement on Trade on Services (GATS) extends the rules based
multilateral trading system to the wide area of services. Similar advantages
should accrue to developing countries from the operation of a rules based system
in services as has been the case for merchandise trade.
While many developing countries are not
presently well placed to take advantage of some of the improved market access
opportunities which the Agreement will provide, they will be in a position to do
so in the future as their domestic supply capacity increases. However, a number
of areas of export interest to developing countries (for example the movement of
natural persons) have already been committed to liberalization by major
importing countries or are the subject of ongoing negotiations to improve market
access. Further, the GATS is unique in that it permits Member countries,
including developing countries, to negotiate the conditions under which foreign
services suppliers may establish in their countries.
These
terms and conditions are bound in the schedules of the Members concerned. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
offers potential benefits for developing countries by creating a framework which
is conducive to technology transfer and foreign direct investment. Its main
disciplines include non-discrimination (i.e. most-favoured-nation and national treatment)
and the equal application by all Members of minimum standards of protection in
relation to all categories of intellectual property rights.
Evidence
on the relationship between an outward orientation in government policies and
growth points to the fact that if trade is to be a positive stimulus to
achieving sustainable development in the coming decade, the conditions affecting
supply in developing countries, including competitiveness at the domestic level,
play a critical role. Consequently, many developing countries have undertaken
autonomous trade liberalization as part of wider programmes of economic reform
and chosen to bind in GATT their recent trade liberalization. In this respect,
the Uruguay Round has proven particularly timely, as these countries have been
able to participate fully in the Round and actively promote and consolidate
their own economic reforms. Adoption by developing countries of binding
commitments in the Uruguay Round is a manifestation of their contribution to
operating a transparent, open and predictable trade regime. This represents an
important change in the relationship for many developing countries with the
multilateral trading system. As a result of the Uruguay Round, developing
countries will in general assume the same disciplines as their developed country
trading partners, but in some instances benefit from greater flexibility in
their implementation. Under certain circumstances developing countries can, for
example, use quantitative restrictions and export subsidies that are not
available for their developed counterparts. Further, they have been required to
bind fewer tariffs than the developed countries, open fewer service sectors and
have a longer time-frame for the implementation of their TRIPS obligations.
In any multilateral trade negotiations - in
particular those as complex as the Uruguay Round negotiations - not all
countries can expect to achieve what they consider to be positive results in
each area of interest to them.
However,
with broadbased and significant reductions in border restrictions, all countries
benefit positively even if there are, on occasions, temporary negative side
effects. While the results of the Uruguay Round offer benefits for all
developing countries, various aspects have been identified as having potential
negative implications. In the main body of this document, these concerns are
addressed with a view to providing a balanced view of the outcome of the
negotiations for developing countries.
The
vast results of the Uruguay Round require an institution to facilitate the
implementation, administration, operation and furthering of the objectives of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, a common
institutional framework encompassing the GATT as modified by the Uruguay Round
(i.e. the GATT 1994), alongside with all Agreements and Arrangements concluded
under GATT auspices and other Agreements and Ministerial Decisions/Declarations
resulting from the Uruguay Round is envisaged. This will serve as a vehicle to
ensure a "single undertaking approach" to the results of the Uruguay
Round: membership in the WTO will automatically entail accepting all the results
of the Uruguay Round without exception.
One
of the functions of the WTO will be to cooperate with the International Monetary
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its
affiliated agencies. In this respect, a Ministerial Declaration emanating from
the Uruguay Round on the contribution of the WTO to achieving greater coherence
in global economic policy-making is important.
It
sets out concepts and proposals with respect to increasing the contribution of
the WTO to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making. The
Declaration recognizes the need for an adequate and timely flow of concessional
and non-concessional financial and real investment resources to developing
country Members, and for further efforts to address debt problems, to help
ensure economic growth and development.
There
is also a recognition that trade liberalization forms an increasingly important
component in the success of the adjustment programmes that many Members are
undertaking, and that this often involves significant transitional social costs.
The Director-General of the WTO is called upon to review, with his opposite
numbers in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the implications
of the WTO's future responsibilities for its cooperation with the Bretton Woods
institutions.
The
World Trade Organization (WTO) is a single institutional framework encompassing
the GATT and all the agreements and legal instruments negotiated in the Uruguay
Round: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT 1994 and other
agreements covering trade in goods; the General Agreement on Trade in Services
or GATS; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Protection or TRIPs; the Understanding on the Dispute Settlement (DSU); and the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).
In
addition, there are a number of Ministerial Decisions and Declarations that
supplement the agreements reached.
The WTO will be headed by a Ministerial
Conference meeting at least once every two years. A General Council will be
established to oversee the operation of the WTO between meetings of the
Ministerial Conference, including acting as a Dispute Settlement Body and
administering the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. The General Council will have
three principal subsidiary bodies: the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council
for Trade in Services and the Council for TRIPs; these bodies can, on their
side, establish subsidiary bodies. The Ministerial Conference will establish a
Committee on Trade and Development. Unless otherwise provided for, decisions
will be taken by consensus, continuing the GATT practice.
While
the WTO is not a successor organization to the GATT, contracting parties to the
GATT 1947 will automatically become Members of the WTO if they assume the
obligations provided for in the agreements on goods, services and intellectual
property protection, and submit schedules of concessions covering trade in goods
(including both market access and subsidy commitments in the case of
agricultural products) and services.
This
ensures a "single undertaking" approach to the results of the Uruguay
Round, since membership in the WTO will entail accepting all the results of the
Round without exception. The WTO will also provide a forum for future trade
negotiations.
The
special status of developing countries in the GATT will continue to receive
recognition in the WTO. The preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO
states that "there is a need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a
share in the growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development". In addition to retaining the provisions that
concerned developing countries in GATT 1947, the new agreements generally
contain provisions for developing countries and least-developed countries, often
consisting of longer transition periods for the full implementation of some
obligations and various exemptions from obligations, particularly for the latter
group of countries. Also, in some instances, the exports of developing countries
benefit from a better treatment with respect to measures taken by other WTO
Members. Technical assistance is to be provided to developing countries to
assist them in assuming their obligations and more effectively realizing the
benefits of the multilateral trading system.
Least-developed
countries are singled out in the Final Act as requiring special attention. This
is reflected in the agreements through a number of provisions which provide the
most favourable treatment for this group in terms of rights as well as lower
levels of obligations. In addition, the Decision on Measures in Favour of
Least-Developed Countries makes provision for measures of special assistance,
including technical assistance "in the development, strengthening and
diversification of their production and export bases including those of
services, as well as in trade promotion, to enable them to maximize the benefits
from liberalized access to markets".
As part of its functions, the Committee on
Trade and Development (a subsidiary body of the General Council) will
periodically review the special provisions in favour of least-developed
countries and report to the General Council of the WTO for appropriate action.
The
Declaration on the Contribution of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence in
Global Economic Policy-making identifies the need for strengthening the
relationship between the activities of the WTO, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD) as a way of ensuring greater coherence in global
economic policy-making. It notes, amongst other things, that progress in the
trade area is linked to greater exchange rate stability, to an adequate and
timely flow of concessional and non-concessional financial and real investment
resources to developing countries, and further efforts to address debt problems.
It also recognizes that while difficulties whose origins lie outside the trade
field cannot be redressed through measures taken in the trade field alone, there
are nevertheless interlinkages between the different aspects of economic policy.
The Declaration provides guidelines on how the cooperation between the three
organizations could be developed; in particular, it calls on the
Director-General of the WTO to review, with his opposite numbers of the IBRD and
the IMF, the implications of WTO's future responsibilities for its cooperation
with the Bretton Woods Institutions. The fact that such interlinkages and,
further, that the relation between economic adjustment and social costs have
been explicitly recognized within the WTO context has been considered of
considerable importance by developing countries. As underlined during the
Uruguay Round negotiations, Ministers expect that such greater coherence will
result not only in reinforced surveillance of national policies, but also, inter
alia - and according to the working relations that will be established between
the three institutions - ensure that developing countries which join
multilateral efforts to liberalize trade can count on support to overcome
financial pressures arising during the adjustment process, and help in reducing
a perceived lack of consistency, in certain instances, between trade policy
recommendations made in the context of lending programmes to developing
countries and GATT/WTO requirements.
2)WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization dealing with the global rules of trade between nations . Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly , predictably and freely as possible.
The WTO is the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system . It provides the principal contractual obligations determining how governments frame and implement domestic trade legislation and regulations . It is the platform on which trade relations among countries evolve through collective debate , negotiation and adjudication.
The WTO was established on January 1,1995.Governments concluded the Uruguay Round negotiations on December 15,1993 and Ministers gave their political backing to the results by signing the Final Act at a meeting in Marrakesh ,Morocco in April 1994.The ‘Marrakesh Declaration’ of April 15,1994,affirmed that the results of the Uruguay Round ,the eighth trade round held under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),would ‘strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment , employment and income growth throughout the world.’ The WTO is the embodiment of the Uruguay Round results and the successor to the GATT.
WTO&GATT
· Not only does the WTO have a larger membership than GATT(140 countries by February 2001 versus 128 for GATT),it also has a much broader scope in terms of the commercial activity and trade policies it applies .
· The GATT applied only to trade in merchandise goods
· The WTO covers trade in goods services and ‘trade in ideas’ or intellectual property.
· The WTO is not a simple extension of GATT; on the contrary ,it completely replaces its predecessor and has a very different character. Among the principal differences are the following:
· The GATT was a set of rules ,a multilateral agreement ,with no institutional foundation only a small associated secretariat which had its origins in the attempt to establish an International Trade Organization in the 1940s.The WTO is a permanent institution with its own secretariat.
· The GATT was applied on a ‘provisional basis’ even if, after more than 40years ,governments chose to treat it as a permanent commitment. The WTO commitments are full and permanent.
· The GATT rules applied to trade in merchandise goods. In addition to goods ,the WTO covers trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property.
· While GATT was a multilateral instrument, by the 1980s many new agreements had been added of a plurilateral ,and therefore selective, nature. The agreements which constitute the WTO are almost all multilateral and, thus involve commitments entire membership.
· The WTO dispute settlement system is faster , more automatic ,and thus much less susceptible blockages, than the old GATT system. The implementation of WTO dispute findings will also be more easily assured.
· The GATT continues as ‘GATT 1994’, The amended and up-dated version of GATT 1947, which is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and which continues to provide the key disciplines affecting international trade in goods.
· The WTO continues GATT’s tradition of seeking to make decisions not by voting but by consensus .This procedure allows members to ensure their interests are properly considered even though ,on occasion ,they may decide to join a consensus in the overall interests of the multilateral trading system. Where consensus is not possible ,the WTO agreement allows for voting. In such circumstances, decisions are taken by a majority of the votes cast and on the basis of ‘one country, one vote.’
The
essential functions of the WTO are to:
· administer and implement the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements which together make up the WTO
· act as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations seek to resolve trade disputes
· oversee national trade policies
· cooperate with other international institutions involved in global economic policy-making.
The WTO agreement contains some 29 individual legal texts-covering everything from agriculture to textiles and clothing , and from services to government procurement , rules of origin and intellectual property . Added to these are more than 25 additional Ministerial declarations ,decisions and understandings which spell out further obligations and commitments to WTO members.
WTO rules now extend to such traditionally sensitive sectors as trade in agriculture products and textiles and clothing . For agriculture , the rules cover market access conditions , domestic support measures , export subsidy restrictions and food safety , plant and animal health regulations . For trade in textiles and clothing ,new rules call for a 10-year phase out of the Multi-fibre Arrangement and a complete integration of this sector into WTO rules.
Key provisions of the WTO rules outflow discrimination among members and between imported and domestically-produced merchandise . A non-discrimination form known as ‘national treatment’ , requires that once goods have entered a market , they must be treated no less favorably than the equivalent domestically produced goods.
The result of WTO is assurance . Consumers and producers know that they can enjoy secure supplies and greater choice of the finished products , components , raw materials and services that they use . Producers and exporters know that foreign markets will remain open to them.
The result is also a more prosperous , peaceful and accountable economic world.Decisions in the WTO are typically taken by consensus among all member countries and they are ratified by members’ parliaments .Trade friction is channelled into the WTO’s dispute settlement process where the focus is on interpreting agreements and commitments , and how to ensure that countries’ trade policies conform with them . That way , the risk of disputes spilling over into political or military conflict is reduced.
By lowering trade barriers , the WTO’s system also breaks down other barriers between peoples and nations.
At the heart of the system -known as the multilateral trading system- are the WTO’s agreements , negotiated and signed by a large majority of the world’s trading nations , and ratified in their parliaments . These agreements are the legal ground-rules for the international commerce . Essentially , they are contracts , guaranteeing member countries important trade rights .They also bind governments to keep their trade policies within agreed limits to everybody’s benefit.
The agreements were negotiated and signed by governments . But their purpose is to help producers of goods and services , exporters, and importers conduct their business.
The WTO is a rules-based , member-driven organization _all decisions are made by the member governments , and the rules are the outcome of negotiations among members. The goal is to improve the welfare of the peoples of the member countries.
Following the establishment of the GATT in 1948 , average tariff levels fell progressively through a series of seven trade rounds. The Uruguay Round added to that success , cutting tariffs substantially , sometimes to zero, while raising the overall level of bound tariffs significantly .At a higher end of the tariff structure , the proportion of imports into developed countries from all sources that encounter tariffs above 15 percent will decline from 7 to 5 percent and from 9 to 5 percent for imports from developing countries.
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system and WTO members commit themselves not to take unilateral action against perceived violations of the trade rules but to seek recourse in the multilateral dispute settlement system and to abide by its rules and findings.
The WTO also examines the links between trade and environment. A committee on this subject was established in early 1995 to explore issues such as :multilateral environmental agreements; the sustainable developments; environment and trade interface; trade in domestically prohibited goods; packaging ,labelling and cycling requirements and the transparency of trade related environmental measures.
The WTO has 140 members.Some of them are:Argentina, Brazil,Cyprus,Turkey, United States, United Kingdom ,United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, Japan, Switzerland, Cuba,Canada, Central African Republic, Malta, Finland,Peru,Nigeria,Portugal, Morocco,Kenya,Tunisia,France….
3)
ORGANIZATION&STRUCTURE OF THE WTO
The WTO’s overriding objective is to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and predictably.It does this by:
Structure
The WTO has more than 130 members, accounting for over 90% of world trade. Over 30 others are negotiating membership.
Decisions are made by the entire membership. This is typically by consensus. A majority vote is also possible but it has never been used in the WTO, and was extremely rare under the WTO’s predecessor, GATT. The WTO’s agreements have been ratified in all members’ parliaments.
The WTO’s top level decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference which meets at least once every two years.
Below this is the General Council which meets several times a year in the Geneva headquarters. The General Council also meets as the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute Settlement Body.
At the next level, the Goods Council, Services Council and Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Council report to the General Council.
Goods Council’s committees
Numerous specialized committees,
working groups and working parties deal with the individual agreements and other areas
such as the environment, development, membership applications and regional trade
agreements.
Councils
for each broad area of trade, and more
Three more councils, each handling a different broad area of trade, report to the General Council:
· The Council for Trade in Goods (Goods Council)
· The Council for Trade in Services (Services Council)
· The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Council)
Six other bodies report to the General Council. The scope of their coverage is smaller, so they are “committees”. But they still consist of all WTO members. They cover issues such as trade and development, the environment, regional trading arrangements, and administrative issues. The Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996 decided to create new working groups to look at investment and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation. Four more subsidiary bodies dealing with the plurilateral agreements (which are not signed by all WTO members) keep the General Council informed of their activities regularly.
Secretariat
The WTO Secretariat, based in Geneva, has around 500 staff and is headed by a director-general. It does not have branch offices outside Geneva. Since decisions are taken by the members themselves, the Secretariat does not have the decision-making role that other international bureaucracies are given.
The Secretariat’s main duties are to supply technical support for the various councils and committees and the ministerial conferences, to provide technical assistance for developing countries, to analyze world trade, and to explain WTO affairs to the public and media.
The Secretariat also provides some forms of legal assistance in the dispute settlement process and advises governments wishing to become members of the WTO. The annual budget is roughly 117 million Swiss francs.
The WTO Secretariat is located in Geneva. It has around 500 staff and is headed by a director general. Its responsibilities:
Administrative and technical support for WTO delegate bodies (councils,
committees, working parties, negotiating groups) for negotiations and the
implementation of agreements.
Technical
support for developing countries, and especially the least-developed.
Trade
performance and trade policy analyses by WTO economists and statisticians.
Assistance
from legal staff in the resolution of trade disputes involving the
interpretation of WTO rules and precedents.
Dealing
with accession negotiations for new members and providing advice to governments
considering membership.
1.The
system helps to keep the peace.
Peace is partly an outcome of two of the most fundamental principles of the trading system: helping trade to flow smoothly, and providing countries with a constructive and fair outlet for dealing with disputes over trade issues. It is also an outcome of the international confidence and cooperation that the system creates and reinforces.
The history is full of examples of trade disputes turning to wars. At 1930s when countries started to raise trade barriers in order to protect their domestic producers and retaliate against each others’ barriers. This worsened the Great Depression and eventually played a part in the outbreak of World War 2.
After the Second World War two developments helped to avoid a repeat of these disputes turning into world wars. In Europe, international cooperation developed in coal, and in iron and steel. Globally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created.
Both have proved successful, so much so that they are now considerably expanded — one has become the European Union, the other the World Trade Organization (WTO).
To protect a sector is not always the best way.One country can easily lead to retaliation from other countries, a loss of confidence in freer trade, and a slide into serious economic trouble for all — including the sectors that were originally protected. Everyone loses.
Confidence is the most important key to avoid this loss! When governments are confident that others will not raise their trade barriers, they will not be tempted to do the same. They will also be in a much better frame of mind to cooperate with each other.
The WTO Trading System helps to create this confidence…
2.The
system allows disputes to be handled constructively.
More
trade means more opportunities for disputes to arise.There is a possibility that
these disputes can lead to serious conflicts. But in reality, a lot of
international trade tension is reduced because countries can turn to
organizations, in particular the WTO, to settle their trade disputes.
When countries bring their disputes to the WTO,Wto focuses their attention on the rules. Once a ruling has been made, countries concentrate on trying to comply with the rules, and perhaps later renegotiating the rules — not on declaring war on each other.
The increasing number of disputes brought to GATT and its successor, the WTO, does not reflect increasing tension in the world. Rather it reflects the closer economic ties throughout the world, the GATT/WTO’s expanding membership and the fact that countries have faith in the system to solve their differences
3.A
system based on rules rather than power makes life easier for all.
The WTO cannot claim to make all countries equal. But it reduces some inequalities, giving smaller countries more voice, and at the same time freeing the major powers from the complexity of having to negotiate trade agreements with each of their numerous trading partners.
Without the WTO’s system, the more powerful countries would be freer to impose their will unilaterally on their smaller trading partners. Smaller countries would have to deal with each of the major economic powers individually and it would be more difficult for them to avoid such a pressure.
Trade becomes simple for the bigger countries because they can use the single forum of the WTO to negotiate with most of their trade partners at the same time.
4.Freer
trade cuts the cost of living.
The prices of all commodities are effected by trade policies.Protectionism is expensive because it raises prices.The WTO Trading system aims to lower these trade barriers and create a freer trade area with reduced costs of production.This reduces the prices of finished goods and sevies,and an the end it provides a lower cost of living.All studies have proved this idea.
*FOOD
IS CHEAPER
When you protect your agriculture, the cost of your food goes up. Governments are still debating the roles agricultural policies play in a range of issues from food security to environmental protection. But WTO members are now reducing the subsidies and the trade barriers that are the worst offenders. In 2000, new talks started on agriculture.
*CLOTHES ARE CHEAPER
The textiles and clothing trade is going through a major reform — under the WTO — that will be completed in 2005. The programme includes eliminating restrictions on quantities of imports. If customs duties were also to be eliminated, economists calculate the result could be a gain to the world of around $23 billion.
*THE SAME GOES FOR ALL OTHER GOODS….
TVs, radios, videos are or were all more expensive under protectionism.
5.It gives consumers more choice, and a broader range of qualities to choose from.
Imports
allow us more choice — both more goods and services to choose from, and a
wider range of qualities. Even the quality of locally-produced goods can improve
because of the competition from imports.
Because imports are used as materials, components and equipment for
local production; they affect the finished products costs and qualities.This
expands the range of final products and services that are made by domestic
producers, and it increases the range of technologies they can use.
If trade allows us to import more, it also allows others to buy more of our exports. It increases our incomes, providing us with the means of enjoying the increased choice
6.
Trade raises income
Lowering
trade barriers allows trade to increase, which adds to incomes,such as national
incomes and personal incomes. While doing this some adjustments ara necessary.
Additional
income means that ,resources are available for governments to redistribute them.
There
are some examples which show us that an increase in trade raises income. WTO’s
estimations about impact of the Uruguay Round trade deal in 1994 was between
$109 billion and $510 billion added to world income. Other economists have
produced similar figures.
Trade
also poses challenges as domestic producers face competiton from imports. In
order to be competitive,domestic producers adopt by becoming more productive and
effective in what they were already doing.
7.
Trade stimulates economic growth, and that can be good news for employment
Trade
clearly has the potential to create jobs,in practice we see that lowering trade
barriers have been good for employment through increasing job opportunities. But
things in practice are not some with the theories. Absolute protectionisim is
not the way to decrease unemployment.
This
is a difficult subject to be
written in simple words. There is strong eveidence that trade boost economic
growth, and the economic growth means more jobs. Besides these there are some
jobs which are lost with the econýomy growing.
There
are two probles about this:
a)
Tecnological improvement has strong impact on employment and
productivity,while benefiting some jobs,hurting others.
b)
While trade clearly boosts national incomes,this is not always translated
into new employment for workers who lost their jobs as a result of competition
from imports.
Of course the picture is varied around the world. The average length of time a worker takes to find a new job can be much longer in one country. In other words some countries are better at making the adjustments than others. This is partly because some countries have more effective adjustment policies.
Often
job prospects are better in countries involved in trade. In the United States,12
million people owe therir jobs to exports Between 1987 and 1992, employment
growth in companies involved in exporting was around 18% higher than in other
comparable companies.
Sometimes
it is seen that protectionism also hurts
employment. US jobs by restricting imports from japan ended up making cars more
expensive in the US, so fewer cars were sold
and jobs were lost. In other words,as attempt to tackle a problem in the
short term by restricting trade turned into a bigger problem in the longer term.
8.
The basic principles make the system economically more efficient, and they cut
costs.
Many
of the benefits of the trading system are more difficult to summarize in
numbers,but they are still important. They make life simplier for the
enterprises directly involved in trade and
for the producers of goods and services.
Trade allows division of labor between
countries. It allows resources to be used more appropriately and effectively for
production. But the WTO’s trading system offers more than that. It helps to
increase efficiency and to cut costs even more because of important principles
admitted in the system. Imagine a situation where each country sets different
rules and different customs duty rates for imports coming from different trading
partners. Imagine that a company in one country wants to import raw materials or
components, for it’s own production.
This
is the problem of discrimination.Everything will be better in a situation that a
government
announces
it will charge the same duty rates on imports from all countries, and it will
use the same regulations for all products, no matter where they come from,
whether imported or locally produced. Sourcing components would become more
efficient and would cost less.
Non-discrimination
is just one of the key principles of the WTO’s trading system. Others include:
Together
they make trade simpler. In turn means that more jobs and better goods and
services for customers.
9.The
system shields governments from narrow interests.
The
GATT-WTO system which evolved in the second half of the 20th Century helps
governments take a more balanced view of trade policy. Governments are
better-placed to defend themselves against lobbying from narrow interest groups
by focusing on trade-offs that are made in the interests of everyone in the
economy.
Superficially,
restricting imports looks like an effective way of supporting an economic
sector. But it biases the economy against other sectors which shouldn’t be
penalized — if you protect your clothing industry, everyone else has to pay
for more expensive clothes, which puts pressure on wages in all sectors, for
example.
Protectionism
can also escalate as other countries retaliate by raising their own trade
barriers. That’s exactly what happened in the 1920s and 30s with disastrous
effects. Even the sectors demanding protection ended up losing.
So,
if during a GATT-WTO trade negotiation one pressure group lobbies its government
to be considered as a special case in need of protection, the government can
reject the protectionist pressure by arguing that it needs a broad-ranging
agreement that will benefit all sectors of the economy.
10.The system encourages good government.
Under
WTO rules, once a commitment has been made to liberalize a sector of trade, it
is difficult to reverse. The rules also discourage a range of unwise policies.
For businesses, that means greater certainty and clarity about trading
conditions. For governments it can often mean good discipline.
One
kind of trade barrier that the WTO’s rules try to tackle is the quota, for
example restricting imports or exports to no more than a specific amount each
year.
Because quotas limit supply, they artificially
raise prices, creating abnormally large profits
That profit can be used to influence policies because more money is
available for lobbying.
In
other words, quotas are a particularly bad way of restricting trade. Governments
have agreed through the WTO’s rules that their use should be discouraged.
Nevertheless,
quotas of various types remain in use in most countries, and governments argue
strongly that they are needed. But they are controlled by WTO agreements and
there are commitments to reduce or eliminate many of them, particularly in
textiles.
Many
other areas of the WTO’s agreements can also help reduce corruption and bad
government.
Transparency,
clearer criteria for regulations dealing with the safety and standards of
products, and non-discrimination also help by reducing the scope for arbitrary
decision-making and cheating .Quite often, governments use the WTO as a welcome
external constraint on their policies
5)
10 MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE WTO
1.
The WTO dictates governments’ policies.
Not true: The WTO does not tell governments how to
conduct their trade policies. Rather it’s a “member-driven”
organization.The WTO is member-driven which means the rules of the WTO system
are agreements resulting from negotiations among member governments, the rules
are ratified by all members’ parliaments and decisions taken in the WTO are
generally made by consensus among all members.
We
can also say it like that; decisions taken in the WTO are negotiated which are
all accountable and democratic.The only situation when WTO has an effect on a
government’s policies is a dispute or disagreement. The WTO has a Dispute
Settlement Body which makes a ruling by adopting the findings of a panel of
experts or an appeal report. But again the scope of the ruling is narrow.
For example, if a government infringe the rules of the agreement which it had accepted then the WTO has the right to judge. But again if a government has broken a commitment it has to conform, the WTO doesn’t dictate to governments to adopt or drop certain policies. As for the WTO Secretariat , it simply provides administrative and technical support for the WTO and its members. In fact it’s the governments who dictate to the WTO.
2.
The WTO is blindly for free trade at any cost.
Not true: It’s really a question of what countries
are willing to bargain with each other. It all depends on what countries want to
bargain. One of the aims of the WTO system is for countries to lower their trade
barriers and to allow trade to flow more freely. After all, countries benefit
from the increased trade results from lower trade barriers. But what the level
of barriers should be is the subject of countries bargaining with each other.
Their negotiating positions depend on how ready they feel they are to lower the
barriers, and on what they want to obtain from other members in return. It also
provides the rules for how liberalization can take place. The rules of the
agreements allow barriers to be lowered gradually so that domestic producers can
adjust. They have special provisions that take into account the situations that
developing countries face. They also mention when and how governments can
protect their domestic producers. Maybe you can ask what is or how is protected.
Protection from imports that are considered to have unfairly low prices because
of “dumping”. Here, the objective is fair trade. Non-discrimination, stable
conditions for trade, predictability and transparenty are other principles of
the WTO system.
3.The WTO is only concerned about commercial interests. This takes priority over development.
Not true: The WTO agreements agreements are full of
provisions taking the interests of the development into account. Here, the main
objective is sustainable development. Underlying the WTO’s trading system is
the fact that freer trade supports economic growth and development. In that
sense, commerce and development are good for each other. It is still a
continuing debate whether or not developing countries gain enough from the
system. But of course that doesn’t mean to say the system offers nothing for
these countries. The agreements include many important provisions that
specifically take developing countries’ interests into account.
Developing countries are allowed more time to apply numerous provisions of the WTO agreements. Least developed countries receive special treatment, including exemption from many provisions.
4.
In the WTO, commercial interests take priority over environmental protection
Not true: Many provisions take environmental concerns
specifically into account.
The
preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
includes among its principles, optimal use of the world’s resources,
sustainable development and environmental protection. This is backed up in
concrete terms by a range of provisions in the WTO’s rules. Among the most
important ones are umbrella clauses which allow countries to take actions to
protect human, animal or plant life or health, and to conserve exhaustible
natural resources.
Differently
from the main aims, specific agreements on specific subjects also take
environmental concerns into account. Subsidies are permitted for environmental
protection. What are these environmental protection? Product standards, food
safety, intellectual property protections.
What’s
more, the system and its rules can help countries allocate scarce resources more
efficiently and less wastefully. For example, negotiations have led to
reductions in industrial and agricultural subsidies, which in turn reduce
wasteful over-production.
These principles are reinforced by a ruling on a dispute brought to the WTO. Here, the most important in the WTO’s rules is that measures taken to protect the environment must not be unfair. They must be non-discriminative. Also another important feature is it is not the WTO’s job to set the international rules for environmental protection. That’s the task of the environment agencies and conventions.So far there has been no conflict between the WTO’s agreements and the international environmental agreements.
5.
The WTO dictates to governments on issues such as food safety, and human health
and safety. Again commercial interests override.
Not true: The agreements were negotiated by WTO member
governments, and therefore the agreements reflect their concerns.
Safety
concerns are built into the WTO agreements.Key clauses which take part in the
agreements specifically allow governments to take actions to protect human,
animal or plant life. But these actions are disciplined, for example to prevent
them being used as an excuse for protecting domestic producers.
Some of the agreements deal in greater detail
with product standards, and with health and safety for food and other products
made from animals and plants. The purpose is to defend governments’rights to
ensure the safety of their citizens.At the same time, the agreements are also
designed to prevent governments setting regulations arbitrarily in a way that
discriminates against foreign goods and services. Safety regulations must not be
protectionism in disguise.
Other
criterion for meeting these objectives is to base regulations on scientific
evidence or on internationally recognized standards.
Again the WTO does not set the standards
itself. In some cases other international agreements are identified in the
WTO’s agreements.One example is CODEX ALIMENTARIUS, which sets recommended
standards for food safety and comes under the UN Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO).
But
there is no compulsory to comply even with internationally negotiated standards
such as those of Codex Alimentarius. Governments are free to set their own
standards provided they are consistent, are not arbitrary, and do not
discriminate.
6. The WTO destroys jobs, widens the gap between rich
and poor.
Not
true:
The accusation is inaccurate . Trade can be a powerful force for creating jobs
and reducing poverty. Often it does just that. Sometimes adjustments are
necessary to deal with job losses, and here the picture is complicated. In any
case, the alternative of protectionism is not the solution.
The
relationship between trade and employment is difficult to understand.
The
country that lowers its own trade barriers is the biggest beneficiary. The
countries exporting to it also gain, but less. In many cases, workers in export
sectors enjoy higher pay and greater job security.
We
can also say that; producers and their workers who were previously protected
clearly face new competition when trade barriers are lowered. Some survive by
becoming more competitive. Others don’t. Some adapt quickly (for example by
finding new employment), others take longer.
In
particular, some countries are better at making the adjustments than others.
This is partly because they have more effective adjustment policies. Those
without effective policies are missing an opportunity because the boost that
trade gives to the economy creates the resources that help adjustments to be
made more easily.
In the WTO, liberalization takes place by a series of small changes over a long period, allowing countries time to make the necessary adjustments. Provisions in the agreements also allow countries to take contingency actions against imports that are particularly damaging, but under strict disciplines.
At
the same time the result of negotiations. create liberalization under the WTO .
When countries feel the necessary adjustments cannot be made, they can and do
resist demands to open the relevant sections of their markets.
There
are also many other factors outside the WTO’s responsibility that are behind
recent changes in wage levels.
Why
for example is there a widening gap in developed countries between the pay of
skilled and unskilled workers?
Reporting
to the OECD, imports from low-wage countries account for only 10–20% of wage
changes in developed countries. Much of the rest is attributable to
"skill-based technological change".
In
other words, developed economies are naturally adopting more technologies that
require labour with higher levels of skill.
The alternative to trade — protection — is expensive because it raises costs and encourages inefficiency.
According
to another OECD calculation, imposing a 30% duty on imports from developing
countries would actually
At
the same time, the focus on goods imports distorts the picture. In developed
countries, 70% of economic activity is in services, where the effect of foreign
competition on jobs is different — if a foreign telecommunications company
sets up business in a country it may employ local people, for example.
Finally,
while about 1.5 billion people are still in poverty, trade liberalization since
World War II has contributed to lifting an estimated 3 billion people out
of
poverty.
7. Small countries are powerless in the WTO.
Not true: Small countries would be weaker without the WTO. The WTO increases their bargaining power.
In
the WTO trading system, everyone has to follow the same rules. As a result, in
the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure, developing countries have successfully
challenged some actions taken by developed countries
If
this smaller countries dont join
the WTO , these countries would
have been powerful trading partners. At
the same time, the rules are the result of multilateral negotiations (i.e.
negotiations involving all members of GATT, the WTO’s predecessor).
The most recent negotiation, the Uruguay Round
(1986–94), was only possible because developed countries agreed to reform
trade in textiles and agriculture — both of them were important in the
developing countries.
8.The
WTO is the tool of powerful
lobbies
Not true: The WTO system offers governments a means to reduce the influence of narrow vested interests
The outcome of a trade round has to be a balance of interests. Governments can find it easier to reject pressure from particular lobbying groups by arguing that it had to accept the overall package in the interests of the country as a whole.
*A related misunderstanding is
about the WTO’s membership.
The
organization of governments is the WTO and the private sector,
non-governmental organizations and other lobbying groups do not become involved
in WTO activities except in special events such as seminars and symposiums.
WTO’s membership can only apply a quality their influence on WTO decisions through their governments.
9.
Weaker countries have no choice, they are
forced to join the WTO.
Not
true:
Most countries do feel that it’s better to be in the WTO system than
to be outside it. That’s why the list of countries negotiating membership
includes both large and small trading nations.
The
reasons are positive rather than negative. They lie in the WTO’s key
principles, such as non-discrimination and qoality of being transparent.
If
this smaller countries join the WTO and then,
a small country automatically enjoys the benefits that all WTO members
grant to each other.
The alternative would be to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with each trading partner. That could even include regularly negotiating the regular renewal of commitments to treat trading partners as equals.
For
this, governments would need more resources, a serious problem for small
countries. And in bilateral negotiations smaller countries are weaker.
By joining the WTO, small countries can also increase their bargaining power by forming alliances with other countries that have common interests
10.The
WTO is undemocratic.
Not
true: Decisions
in the WTO are generally by consensus. In principle, that’s even more
democratic than majority rule because everyone has to agree.
Every
counry has the same bargaining power that ýt would be wrong to suggest . In spite of this;, the consensus rule means every country has
a voice, and before this countries
join a consensus every country has
to be persuaded. .
Quite
often reluctant countries are persuaded by being offered something in
return.Every country accepts the decisions that’s means
Consensus There are no
dissenters.
6.)TURKEY&WTO RELATIONS
TRADE POLICY REVIEWS: FIRST PRESS RELEASE, SECRETARIAT AND GOVERNMENT
SUMMARIES
Turkey: October 1998
Turkey's
far-reaching structural and legislative reforms, undertaken within the framework
of the customs union with the European Union, have led to improved market access
and a more secure trading environment for all investors and traders.
Turkey's
trade agreement with the EU leads to improved business environment for all
foreign investors and traders
Turkey's
far-reaching structural and legislative reforms, undertaken within the framework
of the customs union with the European Union, have led to improved market access
and a more secure trading environment for all investors and traders. According
to a new WTO Secretariat report on Turkey's trade policies and practices, these
reforms are expected to yield significant economic benefits. The commitments
undertaken in the agreement with the EU go well beyond the basic requirements of
a custom union, as well as Turkey's obligations in the Uruguay Round.
The
new WTO Secretariat report and a policy statement prepared by the government of
Turkey will provide the basis for a review of Turkey's trade policies and
practices on 12 and 13 October 1998.
Since
the Turkey-EU customs union entered into force on 1 January 1996, Turkey has
adopted the EU common external tariff on most industrial imports and on the
industrial component of processed agricultural goods. In addition, import
surcharges have been virtually eliminated, thereby simplifying the calculation
of taxes payable on imports. As a result of these policies, the average tariff
has been cut from 27% in 1993 to 13% in 1998. Turkey has also harmonized much of
its legislation with that of the EU in the areas of customs provision, duty
concessions, officially supported export credits, competition policy, state aid,
intellectual property rights, standards, and sanitary and phytosanitary
measures.
According to the report, imports into Turkey from the EU increased from US$17
billion in 1995 to US$25 billion 1997, amounting to about half of Turkey's
imports. The report states, however, that exports to the EU
increased only marginally, as most manufactured exports have been traded
duty-free since the early 1970s and agriculture is yet to be liberalized. While
there may be concern about possible trade diversion resulting from the
customs union, the report notes that third countries should altogether benefit
from the alignment of Turkey's tariffs with those of the EU and that reforms are
improving the business environment for all foreign investors and
traders.
The
report notes that agriculture, largely excluded from the customs union,
continues to be subject to extensive and costly government intervention. It
points out important policy imbalances between manufacturing and agriculture and
states that while the manufacturing sector has experienced substantial
liberalization, transfers to the already heavily supported agricultural sector
have increased. According to OECD estimates, total transfers to agriculture
almost doubled in the period 1994 to 1997, reaching the equivalent of 7.5% of
GDP. With the increase of the MFN tariff from 35% in 1993 to 43% in 1998, tariff
protection in the agriculture sector constitutes a significant barrier to
imports. In contrast, Turkey's average MFN tariff on imports of manufactures
more than halved during the same period from 27% to 12%.
The report observes that the overall economic situation remains fragile in
Turkey, mainly because of the slow progress in the implementation of key
structural reforms. Turkey suffers from high fiscal deficits and high inflation.
The costly social security system needs to be restructured along with the
banking sector which suffers from a number of weaknesses, such as preferential
lending to favoured sectors, weak supervision and accounting standards, and
cross-ownership. While the Turkish government passed a comprehensive law on
privatization in 1994, the report notes that implementation has been slow.
Privatization of dominant state economic
enterprises in areas such as air transport and basic telecommunications has been
initiated but has yet to be completed.
Several service sectors are beginning to open up but in certain sectors, particularly finance and banking, investors still require special government approval before being allowed to enter the market. Turkey did, however, undertake commitments in each of the three major negotiations concluded in the WTO in 1997, mainly the information technology agreement and the financial and telecommunications services agreements.
The report concludes that while Turkey's overall economic performance is strong, the efficiency of the economy would benefit from the privatization of state economic enterprises and a reform of the financial sector. Changes induced by the customs union, however, are expected to have significant economic benefits, especially in terms of restructuring and modernization of the manufacturing sectors. Other countries should also benefit from the market-opening in manufactures and greater security in the trade regime and business environment. However, the current trend of increasing support in agriculture is contrary to the liberalization seen elsewhere in the economy.
This sectoral imbalance, states the report,
could be a tax not just on consumer welfare but also implicitly on manufacturing
and services that compete with agriculture for production factors.
Notes to Editors
The WTO's Secretariat report, together with a policy statement prepared by the Turkish Government, will be discussed by the WTO Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) on 12 and 13 October 1998. The WTO's TPRB conducts a collective evaluation of the full range of trade policies and practices of each WTO member at regular periodic intervals and monitors significant trends and developments which may have an impact on the global trading system. The Secretariat report covers the development of all aspects of each of Turkey's trade policies, including domestic laws and regulations, the institutional framework, trade policies by measure and by sector. Since the WTO came into force, the new "areas" of services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights are also covered.
The Secretariat's report:
TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY: TURKEY
Report by the Secretariat - Summary Observations
Since the previous Trade Policy
Review in 1994, Turkey has implemented a wide range of reforms within the
framework of the customs union between Turkey and the EU, taking it
significantly beyond its Uruguay Round
commitments as well as generating improved and more secure trading opportunities
for third countries. In addition to halving its manufacturing tariffs to the
levels of the EU common external tariff (CET), Turkey has also harmonized much
of its legislation with that of the EU in areas such as competition policy,
customs provisions, intellectual property rights and standards. While the
Customs Union Decision (CUD) has clearly resulted in an overall liberalization,
some new trade measures were introduced as a result of the customs union
(quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing, and tariff quotas). Another
area of concern is the policy imbalance between manufacturing and agriculture:
over the past four years, the manufacturing sector has experienced substantial
liberalization while transfers to the already heavily supported agricultural
sector have increased. In addition, macroeconomic imbalances (high fiscal
deficits and inflation) and slow progress in the implementation of key
structural reforms (including in the social security system, the privatization
programme and in banking) may threaten the sustainability of Turkey's strong,
but variable, growth performance.
EconomicEnvironment
In 1994, the Turkish economy experienced a
severe recession, following growth of 8% in 1993. A severe budget deficit and
real currency appreciation triggered a financial and foreign exchange crisis at
the beginning of 1994, leading to a contraction of 6% in GNP for the year.
However, the economy quickly recovered, aided by the customs union between
Turkey and the EU and deregulation in general: annual average growth between
1995 and 1997 was 7.7%. Over the same period, the current account deficit
widened somewhat but was generally kept at a manageable level. Gross
international reserves accumulated to a record high of nearly five months of
merchandise imports and the real exchange rate remained relatively stable.
Historically, expenditures on state economic
enterprises were a major source of Turkey's fiscal imbalances. These have
largely been brought under control; however, social security spending and
interest payments have now
become major causes of the deficit. In the past, monetization of deficits
contributed to high inflation, but the new Banking Act has greatly limited the
Central Bank's ability to do so. The Government has, instead, resorted
to domestic borrowing on the open market. As a result, the public sector
borrowing requirement almost doubled between 1995 and 1997, reaching 8% of GNP.
This has driven up real interest rates, threatening to crowd out private
investment.
Despite the recovery, the overall economic
situation remains fragile, particularly in respect of price inflation.
Macroeconomic imbalances and slow progress in the implementation of key
structural reforms (including in the social security system, the privatization
programme, and banking) may threaten the sustainability of the strong growth
performance.
Developments in Turkey's Trade Policy Regime
Far-reaching structural and legislative
reforms have been undertaken by Turkey in connection with its customs union with
the European Union. Exposure to foreign competition has increased as trade
barriers have been lowered on an MFN basis, and many trade-related reforms have
been implemented while others are in the pipeline. Over the past four years,
Turkey has also enacted a comprehensive law on privatization and simplified its
already relatively liberal foreign direct investment regime. However, the
restructuring of the costly social security system, the implementation of the
privatization programme and reform of the banking sector are areas where much
remains to be done. The adoption of the CUD has improved market access
conditions for third countries to most sectors of the Turkish market, and the
implementation of many of the trade-related reforms will improve the
business environment for foreign investors and traders. The Decision, however,
has also obliged Turkey to introduce some new external trade measures to achieve
harmonization with those of the EU.
As bilateral barriers have been lifted, trade
between Turkey and the EU has grown. Imports from the EU increased from US$17
billion in 1995 to US$25 billion in 1997, amounting to about half of Turkey's
imports. However, exports to the EU increased only marginally, as most
manufactured exports have been traded duty-free since the early 1970s and
agriculture is yet to be liberalized. While there may be concern about trade
diversion, third countries should generally benefit from the alignment of
Turkey's tariffs with the EU CET. Since 1 January 1996, Turkey has been applying
the same rules of origin as the EU with respect to imports from third countries,
in
terms of both preferential and non-preferential rules.
In most areas, Turkey's commitments towards
the EU involve obligations exceeding those of the WTO Agreements. However, some
legislative changes introduced since the previous Review have also been induced
by WTO commitments including on trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights (TRIPS) and safeguards. As a result of the Uruguay Round, the share of
bound tariff lines increased from 31 to 46%, with all agricultural lines
bound. While nominal bindings in industry are generally well above applied
rates, the CUD obliges Turkey not to impose higher tariffs than the EU common
external tariff (except in areas where the CUD does not apply, mainly
in agriculture) with the consequence that Turkey's tariff is, in practical
terms, bound at EU rates.
Specific Trade and Trade-Related Measures :
Tariff and non-tariff border measures
Since the previous Trade Policy Review in
1994, Turkey has further opened its economy to foreign competition. The Mass
Housing Fund (MHF) levy has been virtually eliminated, thus simplifying taxes
payable on imports and improving transparency. In 1998 the levy covered 3% of
the tariff lines, compared with 87% in 1993. In addition, in January 1996,
Turkey adopted the EU common external tariff (CET) on most industrial imports
(except for 290 "sensitive" items at the twelve-digit level on which
tariffs will remain above the CET until 1 January 2001) and on the industrial
component of processed agricultural goods. As a result of these actions, the
average level of border taxation (including the MHF) was cut by more than half
from 27% in 1993 to 13% in 1998. On the other hand, substantial tariff
dispersion continues to exist and there is a large number of tariff rates (242
distinct rates, excluding ad valorem equivalents) with the greatest variations
seen in agriculture. Turkey ranks sixth among WTO Members for the number of
final anti-dumping measures imposed between 1989 and 1996; however, the number
of new cases initiated has declined in recent years and no new final measures
have been introduced since 1995. Turkey is not obliged under the CUD to adopt
the EU's anti-dumping measures, and the two parties retain their
mutual rights in this area. Import certificates were abolished in 1996, but a
number of goods remain subject to prior import licensing, partly related to the
enforcement of standards.
Internal measures
Turkey's state-aid system of tax exemptions
and concessional credit is complex, non-transparent and generous, amounting to
7.5% of GDP in agriculture alone. The wide range of factors determining the
value of incentives poses difficulties in evaluating the impact of the schemes.
State economic enterprises increased their share of GDP (at constant prices)
from 8% in 1991 to 11% in 1994 (latest available data), but evidence suggests
that this role may have diminished since then. Moreover, the financial position
of the enterprises has improved, largely because of the adoption of more
realistic, market-based pricing policies. Nevertheless, the demarcation
between the private and the public sector is not always clearly defined. In this
regard, the comprehensive privatization law of 1994 provides a framework for
progress, but the privatization process has so far been slow
and marred by legal disputes. The private sector environment has improved with
the enactment of a modern and comprehensive legal framework in the area of
intellectual property and the establishment of a competition board. However,
enforcement capacity is lagging behind the legislative progress.
Outlook
While Turkey's overall economic performance is strong, the budget
deficit continues to be a drag on the economy, causing high inflation and
elevated real interest rates to the detriment of private investment. Moreover,
the
slow progress in the implementation of key structural reforms, such as reform of
the social security system, may hinder improvement of the fiscal position. The
efficiency of the economy would also benefit from moving ahead
with the privatization of state economic enterprises and reform of the financial
sector. The reforms induced by the customs union between EU and Turkey are
expected to have significant economic benefits, especially in
terms of restructuring and modernization of the manufacturing sector; by and
large, other countries should also benefit from the market-opening in
manufactures and greater security in the trade regime and business environment.
However, the agreement with the EU does not cover agricultural products, and the
current trend of increasing support in this sector is contrary to the
liberalization seen elsewhere in the economy. This sectoral
imbalance could be a tax not just on consumer welfare but also implicitly on
manufacturing and services that compete with agriculture for production factors.
TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY: REVIEW OF TURKEY TPRB'S EVALUATION
The Trade Policy Review Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) concluded its second review of Turkey's trade policies on 12 and 13 October 1998. The text of the Chairperson's concluding remarks is attached as a summary of the salient points which emerged during the discussion. The review enables the TPRB to conduct a collective examination of the full range of trade policies and practices of each WTO member country at regular periodic intervals to monitor significant trends and developments which may have an impact on the global trading system.The review is based on two reports which are prepared respectively by the WTO Secretariat and the government under review and which cover all aspects of the country's trade policies, including its domestic laws and regulations, the institutional framework, bilateral, regional and other preferential agreements, the wider economic needs and the external environment.
TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY: REVIEW OF TURKEY CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON
The second Trade Policy Review of Turkey was conducted by the TPR Body on 12-13 October 1998. These remarks, prepared on my own responsibility, are intended to summarize the main points of the discussion; they are not intended as a full report. Details of the discussion will be reflected in the minutes. The representative of Turkey provided replies in the context of the meeting and undertook to supply further written replies within one month.
The discussion developed under four main themes:
(i) economic background;(ii) trade and
investment regime; (iii) specific trade measures; and (iv)
sectoral issues.
Economic background
Members commended Turkey for its implementation of far-reaching
structural and legislative reforms since its previous review. These reforms had
contributed to the economy's sound annual average growth of almost 8% in the
past three years. However, some members questioned the sustainability of this
growth performance in the present macroeconomic and external framework, in which
the large fiscal deficit had led to rapid inflation and high real interest
rates. In response, the representative of Turkey said that the slowdown in
economic growth in 1999, resulting principally from the three-year economic
stabilization programme, would help rectify macroeconomic imbalances and reduce
inflation. On the fiscal side, the primary budget surplus in the period
January-August 1998 was six times higher than a year earlier and tax reforms, to
be introduced from January 1999, would further increase revenues in the future.
Wholesale price increases in 1998 were expected to be around 50%, as projected.
Increases in workers' remittances had more than offset growth in the trade
deficit, leading to a continuing improvement in the current account of the
balance of payments.
As Turkey's trade with the Asian region was
small, the current crisis had only a slight adverse effect on exports. Moreover,
since exports to the Russian Federation, a much more important trade partner,
were mostly basic commodities (food and textiles), the negative effects on
Turkey of the devaluation of the rouble were expected to be slight; but there
would probably be an increase in shuttle trade. The turmoil in financial markets
and the consequent outflow of capital from developing countries had had few
effects beyond a rise in Turkey's interest rates.
Trade and investment regime
It was recognized that the customs union
between Turkey and the European Union had given a new impetus to the
liberalization process in Turkey, going beyond its Uruguay Round commitments.
The reforms had led to improved market access and a more secure trading
environment for all investors and traders. Members raised questions and
clarifications on the following:
a. the consistency between the customs union decision, which excluded
agricultural products, and the WTO requirement on removing restrictions on
"substantially all trade" between parties to regional agreements;
b. the effects of Turkey's adoption of common regulations in areas such as rules
of origin, anti-dumping, SPS, and the introduction of quotas on textiles and
clothing; and
c. the possibility of trade diversion as a result of the customs union.
d. Members also sought information on the Government's plans to speed up
privatization of state-economic enterprises; and Turkey's intention to remove
remaining restrictions on foreign direct investment.
e. agricultural products were covered by the customs union. However, the two
parties had agreed to postpone the free movement of agricultural products until
Turkey's adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy. As yet, there was
no fixed plan for this, which would be negotiated bilaterally.
f. The representative also acknowledged that although progress on privatization
had been slow, the new Government had intensified its efforts since June 1997.
46 state-owned enterprises were slated for privatization,
the proceeds of which would be US$5 billion in 1998. It was Turkey's intention
to include telecommunications and oil refineries in privatization.
g. The representative emphasised that Turkey's FDI regime was based on the
principle of national treatment. Almost all sectors open to private investors
were open to domestic and foreign investors alike. Nevertheless,
restrictions on FDI were applied to some sectors on grounds of national
security, public order, health and the maintenance of professional standards.
Turkey had already simplified its screening and approval process, eliminating
approval requirement for investments over US$150 million.
h. Specific trade measures
i. Members complimented Turkey for its implementation of important trade and
trade-related reforms since its previous review. In the tariff area, the average
level of border taxation had been cut from 27% in 1993 to 13% in 1998, while the
Mass Housing Fund levy had been almost eliminated. Other liberalization measures
included elimination of most export subsidies, simplification of customs
procedures, the establishment of a competition
authority, and the enactment of comprehensive legislation covering intellectual
property rights, going beyond the TRIPs Agreement provisions in some areas.
However, members raised concerns and questions on:
j. tariff protection higher than the common external tariff for a number of
"sensitive" items; the increasing difference between MFN applied and
bound duty rates; the introduction of agricultural tariff quotas; and the
Government's plans to simplify the tariff system;
k. the automatic nature of the import licensing system;
l. the anti-dumping procedures applied by Turkey;
m. Turkey's state-aid system, including possible distortionary effects and high
cost, and the system's conformity with Turkey's WTO obligations;
n. enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the date when Turkey's
legislation will be brought in full compliance with the TRIPs Agreement;
o. Government procurement, including the law's Article on "force
account"; treatment granted to foreign and domestic suppliers; channels for
unsuccessful bidders to lodge complaints; and Turkey's intention to accede to
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement; and
p. local-content measures in the automobile sector and their consistency with
Turkey's obligations under the TRIMs Agreement.
q. In response to these issues, the representative of Turkey said that imports
of a limited number of products had been subject to higher duties than the
common external tariff (CET). However, Turkey would gradually align
these rates to the CET by 1 January 2001. He also noted that the existence of
242 distinct tariff rates should not be viewed as complex, in light of the large
number of tariff lines (19,000) in the 12-digit Turkish tariff nomenclature. The
tariff system would be evaluated with a view to simplification
r. The representative of Turkey stated that the import licensing system was in
full conformity with the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing and was applicable to
imports from all sources. The system was automatic in the
sense that, once applicants met established objective conditions, which were
based on security and safety reasons and were intended to protect consumers or
the environment, the licence was issued automatically.
s. The representative stated that Turkey's anti-dumping legislation was yet to
be fully harmonized with those of the European Union. Once the process was
complete, identical practices would be applied to third countries.
Meanwhile, the parties were required to coordinate their actions toward third
countries. The five-year "Sunset" clause of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
would become valid as from 1995.
t. Turning to state aid, he noted that Turkey's system of subsides as a whole
was in line with WTO rules and had been notified in July 1998. The export credit
system implemented by Turkish Eximbank was in full conformity with the
guidelines under the OECD Consensus. Accordingly, the Turkish Eximbank did not
engage in any credit lines with operating losses.
u. On intellectual property rights, a new law covering unresolved copyright
issues was being submitted to Parliament. Regarding patents, Turkey would
protect pharmaceutical and veterinary products and their production
processes at the latest on 1 January 1999. Regarding the protection of
undisclosed test data on pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products
submitted for marketing approval, Turkish law was identical with the TRIPs
Agreement.
v. The representative said that Turkey did not discriminate against foreign
suppliers in government procurement. He also noted that unsuccessful bidders may
lodge complaints against the application of the procurement procedures and the
award of the contract with the procuring entity. Turkey, as an observer to the
Committee on Government Procurement would consider acceding to the Agreement.
Written answers would be provided to the questions on "force account
commission" procedures and tendering by the Electricity and Power
Generation Corporation.
w. The representative also noted that Turkish laws and regulations regarding
foreign direct investment contained no clauses foreseeing local content
requirement. Local content practices had been introduced voluntarily by the
joint-venture partners and were therefore consistent with the TRIMs Agreement.
x. Sectoral issues
y. Members noted with concern the increased protection of the agricultural
sector, while the manufacturing sector had been opened up to foreign
competition. With reference to the Secretariat report, members noted that this
sectoral imbalance could be a tax both on consumer welfare and on manufacturing
and services that compete with agriculture for production factors. On
agriculture, members raised questions on the following:
z. prospects of reversing the levels of tariff protection in agriculture
(which had increased since the previous review from 35% in 1993 to 43% in
1998);
aa. prospects of reducing Government interventions (total transfers amounted to
7.5% of GDP in 1997);
bb. the scientific justification for the ban on imports of live animals and
meat, and its consistency with Turkey's WTO obligations; and
cc. the Government's intentions in the future multilateral trade negotiation in
agriculture. In reply, the representative of Turkey noted that, in line with the
Agreement on Agriculture, Turkey had bound all tariff lines for agricultural
products, and had applied customs duties to these products at or below its
concessions. He also noted that Turkey had progressively scaled down export
subsidies for its agricultural products; domestic support programmes had
been reduced to three products and were in full conformity with their WTO
obligations. Turkey was examining the introduction of a direct-income payment
system. He noted that the ban on imports of live animals and meat was a
temporary measure, related to the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. It was the
Government's intention to terminate this measure once the risk of the disease no
longer existed.
In contrast to the agricultural sector, the
manufacturing sector had been substantially liberalized since the previous
review. For example, as a result of the customs union, average border protection
in the manufacturing
sector had more than halved from 27% in 1993 to 12% in 1998. On services,
members commended Turkey for its contribution during the recent negotiations
including the Information Technology Agreement, the Basic Telecommunications
Services Agreement, and the Financial Services Agreement. Members asked about
the Government's intentions to undertake further commitments with respect to its
GATS schedule. Members also asked about the Government's plans to reform the
financial sector.
In response to these issues, the
representative of Turkey said that the Government was planning to include new
sectors, such as research and development, in its new schedule of specific
commitments during the next services negotiations in the year 2000. He gave
further information on conditions for establishment in professional services and
on maritime transport conditions. On the financial sector, he noted that Turkey
had
fully implemented its commitments. Over and above its commitments, Turkey had
also, inter alia, increased its effectiveness of the supervision of the banking
sector through more stringent enforcement of the capital adequacy
requirement and of the ceiling on banks' net open foreign exchange positions.
REFERENCES
Seade, Jesus, "Results of the Uruguay Round" , The Uruguay Round and the Arab Countries, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996.
International Political Economy Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr03_e.htm
http:/www./wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact6_e.htm
http://fp.chasque.net:8081/ngonet/trade/omc/areas/desar.zzz/rurov.zzz.html
www.globalexchange.org
www.imf.org/external/hp/sec/decdo/wto.html